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LLOYD BURTON*

Negotiating the Cleanup of Toxic
Groundwater Contamination:
Strategy and Legitimacy
INTRODUCTION

Toxic pollution of the nation's drinking water supplies has now become
a familiar public policy issue. Ongoing studies by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and various state governments are finding that
the extent and severity of groundwater contamination is much greater
than had been formerly assumed, both from "non-point sources" such
as agricultural run-off and identifiable "point sources" such as manufac-

turing sites and underground storage tanks.
Several federal statutes have been brought into play in an effort to
control the problem, with mixed results. Different statutes delegate implementation authority to different local, state, and federal agencies, creating
substantial jurisdictional overlap in some areas, disturbing gaps in others,
and a considerable amount of confusion overall. Federal statutes include
the Clean Water Act,' Safe Drinking Water Act,2 Resource Conservation

and Recovery Act,3 and Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (the "Superfund" legislation). 4
Until the early 1980s there was much more public and governmental
*Funding for the research described in this article was provided by a grant from the University
of California's California Policy Seminar; that support is hereby gratefully acknowledged. All inferences, conclusions, and recommendations are solely the author's, however, and are not necessarily
shared by the grantor.
1. 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (1982).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§300(f)-(j)(10) (1982).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§6901-87 (1982).
4. 26 U.S.C. 4611-12, 4661-62, 4681-82 (1982), 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (1982), 42 U.S.C. §§6911I la, 9601-15, 9631-33, §9641, 9651, 9657 (1982); 49 U.S.C. §1190 (1982). The intent of the
"Superfund" legislation is to provide institutional mechanisms for controlling health-threatening
toxic environmental contamination first and (if necessary) resolving legal disputes over liability later.
There is provision in the act for (1) identifying the most hazardous toxic waste disposal sites
nationwide, 42 U.S.C. §9605 (1982); (2) cleaning up sufficiently serious toxic waste spills as they
are discovered, depending on the relative degree of threat they pose, 42 U.S.C. §9604 (1982); (3)
negotiating with parties responsible for a toxic spill to induce them to pay for decontamination in
accordance with governmentally imposed standards (id.); or, if negotiation fails, (4) paying for
decontamination, then suing the responsible party for up to three times the amount of actual cleanup
costs, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982). For a comprehensive article on how these negotiation provisions
have been used so far and how they might be more productively used in the future, see Anderson,
Negotiation and Informal Agency Action: The Case of Superfund, 1985 DUKE L.J. 261 (1985).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 28

attention directed toward the issues of what groundwater protection policies should be adopted and who (that is, which federal and state agencies)
should implement them than on how those policies should be carried out.
But, by the beginning of this decade, commentators, critics, and scholars
were pointing out the shortcomings of the rigorously adversarial "legal
rules" model of implementing environmental policy, and were advocating
instead the adoption of more consensually oriented negotiation-based
strategies for rulemaking, standard-setting, and enforcement. Unfortunately, the EPA's wholehearted embrace of negotiation-oriented enforcement strategies in the early 1980s took place under the administration of
officials oblivious to the ethical obligations imposed by informal process.
Many of them were eventually forced to resign their posts for actions
such as hiring industry consultants to help draft agency regulations, thwarting
public involvement in implementation decisionmaking, and impeding legislative oversight of implementation actions. In the judgment of both
Republican and Democratic congressional critics and much of the general
public, "negotiation" became synonymous with "caving in to industry"
or simple nonenforcement of environmental protection statutes. The legitimacy of negotiation as a compliance and enforcement strategy was cast
into serious doubt.
Yet the negotiated settlement of disputes over the enforcement of state
and federal environmental health legislation continues to be a necessary
option. Even ardent environmentalists concede that negotiated compliance
and enforcement are critical to the success of environmental policies,- in
part because regulatory agencies simply lack the resources to take adjudicatory action against all offenders to final judgment. Likewise, some
observers in and out of government contend that the adversarial, legalistic
implementation of environmental protection policies inhibits the potential
for devising creative solutions to pollution problems, generates inefficiencies in the U.S. economy, and impedes our ability to compete effectively in international markets.
Public confidence in an agency's decision to negotiate a compliance
agreement with a toxic groundwater polluter rather than rely on adversarial
enforcement action might be measurably enhanced if we knew more about
how the agencies make such decisions. What factors do they take into
consideration? How are negotiations conducted, once that option is chosen? How does an agency determine the point at which an acceptable
agreement has been achieved, or at which further negotiation is fruitless?
How can legislative overseers and a concerned public evaluate the quality
5. See Anderson, supra note 4. In this article, "compliance negotiations" refers to negotiation
in lieu of filing an enforcement action as an agency policy implementation strategy, while "enforcement negotiations" refers to negotiations to settle an enforcement action already filed.
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of an agency's adjudicate/negotiate decisionmaking? These are among
the policy issues addressed in this article. 6
It seems that the more research that is done, the more groundwater
contamination problems are found. And given the burgeoning workload
created by these problems, negotiated compliance with groundwater protection statutes will remain an indispensable option for the agencies
responsible for implementing those laws. But lawmakers, senior agency
administrators, and the general public must have some means of being
assured that when the nonadversarial enforcement action route is chosen,
the agency does so for strategically defensible reasons and in a manner
which allows for some modicum of meaningful involvement by interested
parties who will be affected by agency decisionmaking.
The assurance of agency rectitude is provided in adversarial proceedings by notice and opportunity for interested parties to participate, the
generation of a public record at hearings to which the public is invited,
and an appealable order rendered by an impartial tribunal. The drawbacks
to adversarial enforcement are: it is time-consuming, costly, cumbersome,
and heightens antagonistic relationships between government and industry.
We need some means of evaluating nonadversarial enforcement which
will indicate when public suspicion of the negotiation process is warranted
and when it is not. The research described in this article lies chiefly in
that it provides a rational framework for conducting such evaluations.
A second concern of this work is with the legitimacy of an agency's
use of power in informal compliance negotiations. This is because-as
evidenced by the EPA's initial Superfund implementation problemswhen an agency abandons adversarial due process in favor of informal
negotiated settlements, it also runs the risk of losing contact with the rich
source of legitimacy the due process model provides.
THE LEGITIMACY OF ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT
Bureaucratic Authority in the Democratic Context
There is a very real paradox inherent in the administration of democratic
6. The primary intent of the policy research described here was to derive criteria for evaluating
the bargaining behavior of agency adminstrators responsible for controlling toxic groundwater contamination. While data gathering was confined mostly to case studies of the cleanup of selected
"Superfund" sites in Northern California, these observations were not confined to future activity
within California. A recent in-depth review of the role of negotiation in Superfund implementation
has shown that federal, state, and regional bureaucrats nationwide are regularly called upon to engage
in the kind of bargaining behavior described in the following case studies. Anderson, supra note 4.
Accordingly, the policy recommendations concluding this article are broadly conceived, with direct
applicability to any public administrator with the discretionary authority to establish site-specific
groundwater decontamination standards and procedures.
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government. On the one hand, we take justifiable pride in being heirs to
the world's oldest democracy-to a form of government in which the
average citizen is the ultimate source of political authority, and (through
the choice of elected representatives) the ultimate decisionmaker on questions of what should be the purposes of government and how these purposes should be achieved. On the other hand, we have chosen to assign
government the responsibility for performing thousands of tasks considered essential to maintaining our health, safety, prosperity, and welfaretasks requiring discretionary decisionmaking by public servants not elected
by the citizens, and not directly answerable to the citizenry regarding the
effects of their decisions. In the federal work force alone there are nearly
three million men and women, only 537 of whom are elected by those
they will govern.
This 6,000 to I ratio between the day-to-day operators of governmental
machinery and the authors of the operating manual is not unique to
American federal government; nor is it unique to the 80,000 state and
local governments in the United States which are ostensibly controlled
by elected leaders, or even to other Western democratic nations. The
prophetic German sociologist Max Weber told us several decades ago
that, like it or not, complex and highly organized bureaucracies were
becoming indispensable mechanisms for the governance of modem industrialized nations. 7 Whether policy is formulated by democratically elected
representatives or self-appointed dictators, it must be implemented through
bureaucratic organizations.
But, Weber was also quick to point out that simply having the power
to act and the organizational means to exercise that power were not enough
to assure that institutions will govern effectively. Also present must be
the perception by those being governed that their institutions possess the
authority to govern. And authority, in turn, rests upon the ability to
exercise power combined with the public's belief that the power of government is being exercised legitimately.
We have graphic recent evidence that even in repressive, dictatorial
regimes, once a government has lost all claim to the legitimacy of its use
of power, it can utimately lose its power as well. If news accounts of
the fall of the Marcos government in the Phillipines are to be believed,
precipitating events in the closing days of this drama included the refusal
of government employees to carry out orders they felt were illegitimate
uses of power. Vote-counters started refusing to falsify election returns,
and combat commanders refused to kill thousands of innocent unarmed
civilians in the course of suppressing a nonviolent military mutiny. A
popular disaffection so strong that it eventually penetrated the bureaucracy
itself toppled the government.
7. H.

GERTH & C. MILLS, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY

232-35 (1948).
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The next question to arise then is "How do the governed decide when
power is and is not being legitimately used?" Or to put it more academically, "What are the sources of legitimacy from which governmental
institutions derive their authority to act?" An equally academic answer
is "It depends"--on the governmental institution in question, on the
cultural and historical context within which the institution was created,
on the attitudes and values of the governed, and on the task the institution
is being called upon to perform.
And so we return to the paradox of bureaucratic administration in a
democratic society, to focus more specifically on the sources of legitimacy
of American bureacracy. We have plenty of company. The growth of
American bureaucratic government throughout the 20th century has been
paralleled by the growth of an accompanying body of literature warning
of the dangers of delegating too much government authority to unelected
officials. Presidents like Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt expressed great
confidence in the ability of technically expert, apolitical bureaucrats to
exercise power rationally, fairly, and effectively; and they urged Congress
to keep granting the agencies that power. Detractors worried (as Weber
had earlier)8 that the federal agencies would dominate and overpower the
other two branches of government; a commission formed by Franklin
Roosevelt to study these concerns warned in 1937 that the independent
federal regulatory agencies were becoming a "headless fourth branch of
government," and should be abolished.' Instead, Congress moved to
standardize the procedures for discretionary decisionmaking in the federal
agencies, through adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act. First
enacted in 1946, this statute guarantees a modicum of due process in
agency rulemaking, standard-setting, and rule-enforcement.' 0
But, as the breadth of bureaucratic responsibility has continued to grow
since the New Deal, so has public concern over the way the agencies do
their work. During the 1960s, critics charged that the agencies had been
"captured" by the very interest groups had been established to regulate,
and that the democratic ideals of informed citizen participation in decisions affecting their interests were being thwarted by arrogant, indifferent
bureaucrats who listened only to the rich and powerful."
Some observers believe that steadily diminishing public confidence in
the legitimacy of American bureaucratic government has reached crisis
proportions, and that to remedy the situation we must begin by refocusing
our attention on the sources of legitimacy of democratic administrative
8. Id.
9. PRESIDENT'S CoMMTTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, REPORT WITH SPECIAL STUDIES
(1947) [hereinafter THE BROWNLOW REPORT].
10. Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1982).
11. Among the more forceful indictments of the "agency capture" phenomenon is in T. Lowi,
THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969).
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government. Then we must evaluate agency performance in terms of
whether it is honoring these legitimizing values in its day-to-day activities.
In his aptly titled Crisis and Legitimacy," law professor James Freedman argues that the legitimacy of administrative action in American government is classically dependent on four attributes or characteristics:
constitutionality, accountability, fairness, and effectiveness. Each of these
attributes is embodied by one means or another in formal agency decisionmaking, in the relations between agencies and the legislature, or in
court decisions reviewing agency action, as discussed below.
Legitimacy, Administrative Law, and Formal Agency Procedure
Constitutionality
Among the earliest broad delegations of rulemaking and rule-enforcing
authority from legislatures to agencies was the creation of the state railroad
commissions in the latter half of the 19th century. State lawmakers
empowered the commissions to rule on the fairness of rates charged by
the railroads, and to set and enforce standards for the safety and convenience of rail service; Congress followed suit with creation of the
Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887. Later came the Federal Trade
Commission, and-during the Great Depression-a host of new agencies
to regulate economic activity and enhance social welfare.
Railroad attorneys and advocates for other regulated interests first challenged the legitimacy of agency authority on constitutional grounds. They
charged that delegating so much rulemaking and rule-adjudicating authority to unelected bureaucrats violated the principle of separation of powers
among the three branches of government; in rulemaking, the agencies
were exercising powers properly reserved to the legislatures; and in ruleadjudication (trial-type enforcement hearings conducted by administrative
law judges hired by the agency) the bureaucracy was making decisions
constitutionally reserved to the courts. 3
To summarize an otherwise lengthy historical discussion, the federal
courts have not seriously challenged the legislatures' constitutional ability
to delegate rulemaking or rule-adjudication authority or administrative
agencies since 1937. But the courts do continue to hear a somewhat
narrower range of constitutional questions, which may generally be classified into one of three categories: authorization to act, failure to act, and
method of action.
Under the first heading comes the challenge that an administrative
agency's action was not authorized by the legislature-that the agency
12. J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGmMACY (1978).
13. See generally L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 439-54 (2d ed. 1985).
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has interpreted its statutory mandate more broadly than warranted and is
therefore exercising power the legislature did not intend to delegate. 4
Less common but no less significant an issue is the case in which the
executive branch either fails or refuses to so something the legislature
has ordered it to do. 5
A third constitutional argument sometimes raised against agency action,
is a decisionmaking procedure that has violated the due process rights of
one or more interested parties, either by precluding their participation in
the decisionmaking process altogether or by affording inadequate opportunities to defend constitutionally protected interests. Due process guarantees, in the Administrative Procedure Act, are intended to deal with
the problem before federal agencies; most state legislatures have adopted
some sort of threshold procedural guidelines for state agencies to follow
as well, although they are often not formally developed as in the federal
model.
Effectiveness
A somewhat less serious but far more pervasive criticism of bureaucratic behavior is that of ineffectiveness that the agencies are simply not
very good at doing what legislatures tell them to do. While some critics
put the blame mostly with legislators, for failing to state unambiguously
their intent and/or not appropriating funds sufficient for the agencies to
carry out their mission, 6 other observers have focused more on what they
see as the inertial, incremental, risk-adverse nature of bureaucratic behavior.'7 When these criticisms are combined with the fact that in environmental regulation the executive branch is being asked to set and enforce
standards in the context of high levels of scientific uncertainty and incom14. An example of this issue is found in Bob Jones University's appeal from an Internal Revenue
Service decision revoking the school's tax-exempt status, for practicing racial segregation as a matter
of institutional policy. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the agency's authority to revoke tax-exemption
for this reason absent explicit congressional authorization to do so; while Justice Rehnquist's lone
dissenting opinion criticized the agency for (in his view) overstepping its constitutional bounds. Bob
Jones v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
15. Ex-president Nixon, who held a somewhat exalted view of the executive's constitutional
independence, precipitated such a conflict when he ordered the Office of Management and Budget
to impound funds Congress had appropriated (over his veto) to implement the Clean Water Act. In
subsequent constitutional litigation, the Supreme Court unanimously invalidated Nixon's action.
Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975).
16. See supra note 11.
17. FREEDMAN, supra note 12, at 31-57. In addition to the very substantial public administration
literature on incrementalism, inertia, and risk aversion, the federal courts have likewise wrestled
with the problem of when to let an agency take its own time in making environmental decisions.
Compare, for instance, Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1978) thereinafter EDF v. EPA], infra note 19 with Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckleshaus, 439 F.2d 584
(D.C. Cir. 1971). The length of delay and its rational justification (or lack thereof) relative to the
threats posed by inaction seem to the courts to be significant variables.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol, 28

plete information, agency hesitancy to move quickly and forcefully in
some regulatory areas becomes more understandable. 8
One measure of effectiveness is how much time it takes an agency to
get the job done; another is how completely or successfully a policy goal
has been achieved, and by what means. Conducting such an evaluation
requires a careful review of agency decisonmaking in the implementation
process, to determine if appropriate methods were used and available
resources allocated in a way which would maximize the probability of
achieving the desired goal.
While federal judges have been quite willing to review and correct
agency proceduresfor standard-setting, rulemaking, and rule-application,
since the late 1930s they have been reluctant to rigorously scrutinize and
reverse agency conclusions on the content of a rule, standard, or enforcement finding. And if the lower court judges choose to follow the Supreme
Court's lead, they may find themselves becoming even more deferential
to agency expertise in the future. In a Supreme Court reversal of a circuit
court ruling against the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 1978,
Justice Rehnquist openly chastized the lower court judges for, in his
estimation, forcing ever more elaborate procedures on the agency because
they were dissatisfied with the substance of NRC decisionmaking."9
Thus the responsibility for gauging the effectiveness of agency action
falls considerably harder on legislators and on the general public (including the news media). Except in unusual circumstances like those detailed
in EDF v. EPA above-when it took five years and a court order to get
a rule published, standards for measuring agency effectiveness usually
emanate more from public administration scholars and (ideally) legislative
overseers than from the courts.
Accountability and Fairness
The modem civil service system-with its merit-based hiring and promotion, and termination only for cause-has rightly been heralded as a
dramatic improvement over the spoils system which had previously afflicted
American government. Nineteenth century progressive reformers argued
that government hiring based on technical ability, and the subsequent
shielding of government workers from undue political influence, would
18. Understandable, yes; but (in the public view) acceptable, no. An example of environmentalist
and judicial frustration with federal ineffectiveness in toxics regulation maybe found in EDF v. EPA.
This 1978 case was the culmination of a five-year struggle to get the EPA to identify and specify
allowable discharge levels for toxic substances in surface waters, as mandated by Congress in the
1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments. Congressional frustration had also mounted;
in rewriting the Act in 1977, lawmakers did by statute what they had earlier told the EPA to do by
regulation: specify the substances to be controlled.
19. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519
(1978).
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ensure that bureaucratic decisionmaking would be to the ultimate benefit
of the public interest broadly conceived, unlike the old patronage system
in which all public employees owed their jobs to the party in power and
could be summarily fired for party disloyalty.
But once this political insulation had been achieved and the bureaucracy
developed the ability to exercise substantial discretionary authority without fear of political reprisal, the bureaucrats were faced with the problem
of how a democratic society is to make sure that its bureaucracy will
remain a humble and obedient servant, rather than become its functional
master. Freedman's conclusion seems to be that except for the constitutional constraints outlined above, a limitation on political control of
bureaucratic behavior is the price we must pay if we want administrative
decisions made in the public interest rather than partisan political interest.
He finds there to be enough political control over the federal agencies:
Congress can reward or punish individual agencies through the budgetmaking process and oversight investigations, and the president can hire
and fire the most senior-level "politically appointed" administrators at
will.2' In this view, there is a subtle but critical distinction which must
be maintained between political accountability and political malleability:
Bureaucracy must be subject to effective political control (the faithful
execution of congressional and presidential commands) yet free from
political manipulation(distortion of the administrative process to achieve
wholly partisan political ends). The legislature's job is to tell the bureaucracy what to do, as clearly and unambiguously as possible; and the
bureaucracy's job is to do it. Just as the judges must remain free from
undue political influence, so must the bureaucrats.
But there is another aspect to the accountability issue, which receives
less attention in Freedman's formalistic analysis. It has to do not with
the bureaucracy's relationship with the legislature (its immediate source
of delegated authority), but with its relationship to the public (in theory,
the ultimate source of all government authority). From this perspective,
an important source of the legitimacy of bureaucratic power lies in the
bureaucracy's relations with the citizens whose interests will be affected
by agency decisionmaking. The more closely an agency adheres to traditional democratic principles such as informing the public of impending
decisions, and structuring public participation into the decisionmaking
process, the greater the agency's claim to legitimacy in its use of power.
Some analysts, who have urged the agencies to "reconnect" with the
public by structuring more meaningful citizen consultation into administrative action, describe this aspect of accountability as responsiveness."
20. FREEDMAN, supra note 12, at 260.
21. P. NONET & P. SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY INTRANSmON-TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW (1978).
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And as did Freedman, they counsel that being responsive to public concerns in contemplating alternative actions is not the same as "knuckling
under" to the most powerful interest group at decision time; responsiveness is not synonymous with malleability.
Legal scholarship aside, over the last 20 years it has been the federal
judges who have most effectively and articulately addressed the bureaucracy's need to legitimize its decisionmaking through more meaningful
public participation. A host of federal court rulings handed down during
the 1960s and '70s ordered the agencies, by one means or another, to
make their processes of deliberation and decision more open to the public.
The judges evidently hoped that bureaucratic ills like "agency capture"
by powerful regulated interests could be remedied by forcing the agencies
to make more of their decisions in public and invite more public participation before making these decisions. One commentator has concluded
that the federal judiciary forcing the agencies to open up their decisionmaking is one of the most significant transformations American public
administration has undergone in this century; it has resulted in a new and
democratically appealing "interest group representation" model of administrative law, in which no major agency decision may be considered a
sound one unless it is based on a thoughtful consideration of diverse and
substantial public input.22
By forcing such consideration-whether through public hearings, advisory committees, or other solicitation of a broad range of public viewsit is argued that the courts have also enhanced the fairness of agency
decisionmaking. And in Freedman's view, a heightened perception of
agency fairness further legitimizes the use of bureaucratic power. Interested parties at least have the opportunity for their "day in court," even
if administrative decisionmakers do not render a wholly satisfactory "verdict." In mandating more formal and open procedures for making decisions affecting the public interest, the courts have made an important
contribution toward shoring up public confidence in bureaucratic authority---or at least slowing down the rate of erosion.
THE TREND TOWARD INFORMAL, NONADVERSARIAL
PROCEDURE-THEORY AND PRACTICE
Criticisms of Formal Process
As with anything else of value, the opening up of agency procedure
in the interests of fairness and responsiveness has not been cost-free.
22. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1669 (1975).
Of course, Congress has not been altogether silent on these issues either. The 1966 Freedom of
Information Act, and its 1974 amendments, as well as the Government in the Sunshine Act of 1974,
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982), substantially updated the Administrative Procedure Act by formally mandating
greater access to agency policymaking processes.
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Since the courts played a major role in the opening process (and later
Congress by structuring elements of court decisions into Administrative
Procedure Act amendments and various environmental statutes), they
mandated reforms which have had the effect of "legalizing" agency decisionmaking, according to subsequent critics. By forcing the agencies to
adopt threshold due process standards, they have measurably enhanced
the role of lawyers in the bureaucracy and in respresenting the interests
of those affected by bureaucratic decisionmaking. This in turn has tended
to increase the time necessary to reach a decision, the volume of the
evidentiary record which must be accumulated prior to taking significant
action, and has influenced the content and the tone of the decisions
themselves.
Thus, as procedure became more open in terms of who could participate, it also became somewhat more rigid, more complex, and more
time consuming in terms of how that participation was to be structured.
Likewise, the growing necessity of professional representation in agency
proceedings and the amassing of ever more elaborate evidentiary records
increased the expense of effective participation in agency decisionmaking
as well. Even those who recognized the importance of adequate interest
group representation as a legitimizing influence on bureaucratic behavior
perceived the trade-offs at hand. Open, fair, responsive process was also
cumbersome, costly, and lengthy. Ironically, the result in some cases was
that at the same time procedural barriers were being lowered, economic
ones were being raised (namely, participation costs.).
Rise of Negotiated Policy Implementation
By the late 1970s critics of the "due process revolution" were arguing
that the trade-off was sometimes too great-that better decisions were
not emanating from elaborate new processes, and that more informality,
flexibility, and efficiency were sorely needed.
According to this argument, elaborate traditional processes should be
complemented by "alternate decisional processes" such as negotiated
standard-setting and other decisionmaking alternatives to formal advocacy
(for example, technical advisory committees for fact verification).2 3 By
the early 1980s, several federal agencies had begun to heed this advice,
and had brought interested parties together for negotiated rulemaking in
areas such as occupational safety and health, airline regulation, and fair
trade.'
23. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1338
(1981).
24. See Sachs, An Alternative to the Traditional Rulemaking Process: A Case Study in the Development of Regulations, 29 ViIL. L. REv. 1505 (1984); Koch & Martin, F.T.C. Rulemaking-Through
Negotiation, 61 N.C.L. REV. 275 (1983); and Note, Rethinking Regulations: Negotiation As An
Alternative To Traditional Rulemaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1871 (1981).
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As it turned out, however, the concept of negotiated policy implementation evidently meant very different things to different federal agency
administrators. In rulemaking and standard-setting, most administrators
have worked with consensus-based methods as an adjunct to rather than
a total replacement of more traditional processes." But in rule-application
in the situation described below-the EPA from 1981 to 1983-the use
of informal negotiation-based methods precipitated a legitimacy crisis of
such proportions that the Agency's administrator and several of her senior
subordinates were eventually forced to resign their posts (one of them
going from high federal office to federal imprisonment).
Problems of Legitimacy in the Negotiated Implementation of Toxic
Waste Cleanup Programs
To understand how this crisis of public confidence in the EPA arose
during the early 1980s, it will be helpful to view these events from the
perspective of Freedman's legitimacy criteria as described above. The
effectiveness, fairness, responsiveness, and (ultimately) the constitutionality of agency action were called into such serious question that, at the
behest of Congress, key figures in the agency were replaced and a significant new emphasis on the ethics of federal administrative service was
called forth.
Effectiveness
One of the more commonly cited principles of legal negotiation and
settlement is that a negotiator's effectiveness is measurably enhanced by
his or her ability to impose sanctions on an adversary if agreement is not
reached6 Unfortunately, during the same period that EPA Administrator
Burford was publicly emphasizing her agency's new intention to "solve
things informally, nonconfrontationally," '27 she was also cutting back sharply
on the EPA's ability to undertake adjudicative enforcement if negotiations
failed.
Such steps included abolition of the EPA's Office of Enforcement" and
the centralization of all major enforcement decisionmaking in Washington
rather than in the field. 29 Inaddition, the EPA's chief enforcement counsel
was relieved of independent enforcement authority," and-in keeping
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., G. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOIATIONS AND SEEMENT 84-86 (1983); C. KARRASS,
THE NEGOTIATING GAME 183-93, 196-98 (1970), reprinted in H. EDWARDS & J. WHITE, THE LAWYER

122-29 (1977).
27. See supra note 4.
28. Gorsuch Abolishes Office of Enforcement, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1981, at 8, col. 1.
29. Kurtz, Since Reagan Took Office, EPA Enforcement Actions Have Fallen, Washington Post,
Mar. 1,1983, at A6, col. I.
30. Shabecoff, Environmental Enforcement Chief StrippedofPower, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1983,
at I1,col. 6.
AS A NEGOTIATOR
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with administration-wide budget reduction goals-much of the EPA's
enforcement staff was either re-assigned or terminated (a practice eventually halted by the Senate).
Understandably, an abrupt decline in enforcement action accompanied
these reductions. A survey prepared by the House of Representatives in
late 1982, compared EPA enforcement activity during the last year of the
Carter administration with the first full year's enforcementrunder Administrator Burford, found an 84 percent drop in the number of cases referred
by the EPA to the Justice Department for court enforcement. Also discovered were a 78 percent reduction in adjudicatory actions filed by the
EPA itself and a 40 percent drop in the dollar amount of penalties collected.32
EPA critics likewise came to believe that when negotiation was used
to settle enforcement disputes, the settlements were sometimes on terms
so unreasonably favorable to regulated industries that the public interest
was not being adequately served. As an example, the "Superfund" legislation (discussed in detail below) authorizes the EPA to negotiate with
parties responsible for toxic environmental contamination for the containment and cleanup of toxic materials.33 If agreement is reached, the
responsible party finances remedial action; if there is no agreement, EPA
remedies the problem and then sues the responsible party for costs plus
damages. But, during the early days of Superfund implementation, detractors charged that in the name of expeditious, informal settlement, EPA
was in some cases asking dumpers to pay only a fraction of actual cleanup
costs before relieving them of future financial liability;' public funds
would then be required for any further cleanup effort.
Responsiveness and Fairness
The due process, interest-group representation model of administrative
law, ensures a threshold level of fairness and responsiveness in formal
agency decisionmaking through notice of impending action, opportunity
to comment on or participate in public proceedings, reasoned consideration of such commentary, and the right-of-appeal from final action. But
in informal, negotiation-based decisionmaking, the only parties present
are those invited by the agency. The legitimacy of informal process therefore depends heavily on how well administrators can incorporate public
notice and involvement at some meaningful level into nonadversarial,
off-record proceedings.
31. Senate Votes to Bar EPA from Diminishing More Staff, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1983, at I,
col. 6.
32, Kurtz, supra note 29.
33. See supra note 4.
34. Testimony of Congressman Levitas, Before the House Public Works Subcommittee, as repored
in Kurtz, Negotiation Approach Was Dictated by Burford, Lavelle Tells House Unit, Washington
Post, Feb. 25, 1983, at A2, col. 4.
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Here again the EPA developed legitimacy problems during the early
1980s: first by discouraging broad public involvement in its actions, and
secondly by appearing to grant regulated industries unprecedented access
to its inner circles of authority. As an example of the first problem, in
1982 the EPA slashed its public participation budget as part of an ongoing,
agency-wide cost reduction program." But at the same time it was hiring
as special advisors attorneys whose industry clients' interests were being
directly affected by closed-door EPA standard-setting meetings and
enforcement negotiations in which these attorneys participated-thus raising serious conflict-of-interest problems. 6
Compounding the charge that the EPA was providing unwarranted
industry access to its innermost deliberations was the fact that the agency
was hiring program directors who-given their backgrounds--could hardly
be expected to vigorously and even-handedly enforce environmental laws.
The most graphic case in point was that of Rita Lavelle, the California
businesswoman hired to manage the Superfund program.
The Superfund legislation directs the EPA to establish a "national
contingency plan" for the cleanup of hazardous wastes, including the
identification of those sites posing the greatest public health risks.37 In
1981, Ms. Lavelle visited EPA offices in Washington, D.C. as an executive of the Aerojet General Corporation, which had been identified as a
responsible party at toxic contamination sites in California subject to
Superfund enforcement. Her intent was to convince the EPA to take her
company's spill sites off the Superfund high-risk contamination list; a
few months later she found herself directing the cleanup program she had
been seeking on Aerojet General's behalf to circumvent.38
As a result of hiring practices and conflict of interest problems such
as these, the appearance grew that the EPA had become highly responsive
to one sector of American society (toxic polluters) but markedly unresponsive to others. And the reduction of EPA financial support for public
participation, combined with increased exclusive industry access to sensitive levels of agency standard-setting and enforcement decisionmaking,
challenged traditionally held standards of fairness in agency procedureformal or informal.
Constitutionality
Defenders of informal EPA actions during the early days of the first
35. Budget Curb on Public Participation, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1982, at 26, col. 1.
36. Kurtz, EPA Adviser Participated in Regulatory Meetings Affecting Client, Washington Post,
Feb. 24, 1983, at A3, col. 1; Russakoff, EPA Part-timer's Firm Target ofHazards Suit, Washington
Post, Mar. 3, 1983, at A2, col. 4.
37. 42 U.S.C. §9605 (1982).
38. Thornton, President Warned of "Evidence"-Rep. Dingell Asks For Consideration of EPA
Criminal Case, Washington Post, Mar. 3, 1983, at Al, col. 1.
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Reagan administration argued that Administrator Burford was doing no
more than faithfully carrying out campaign promises made by the President. Mr. Reagan had vowed in 1980 that if elected he would "lighten
the heavy hand" of regulation on American business, and seek to foster
more cooperative government-industry relations. Environmental regulation in particular was often cited as an area in which adversarial approaches
needed to be tempered, and the efficiencies of alternative implementation
methods more carefully considered.
And indeed, the earliest, most vocal critics of the Reagan administration
environmental policies were political opponents of the president and his
party. Early criticisms of EPA Administrator Burford's actions inevitably
took on the appearance of partisan sniping. Further, Burford and other
high administration officials were under orders to achieve unparalleled
reductions in federal spending--orders a largely Democratic Congress
had given (at the president's request) to the federal bureaucracy in the
form of the Omnibus Budget Act of 198 1." Some observers felt the EPA
was being unfairly condemned by the party which lost the White House
support for doing its job (lightening regulatory burdens and cutting costs)
too innovatively and too well.
During the latter half of 1982 and early 1983, however, members of
Congress on both sides of the aisle approached a turning point in the
debate over the propriety and efficacy of behavior within the EPA. The
conflict of interest charges were too numerous and appeared too well
founded; the toxic cleanup program mandated by the "Superfund" legislation had yet to demonstrate any significant results;' and there was
growing suspicion that EPA was manipulating this important public health
protection program to reward political friends of the Reagan administration and punish its enemies.
Congessional oversight hearings on the implementation of the Superfund legislation and the 1976 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA-the federal government's other principal hazardous waste law) 4
had been proceeding since late 1980.42 But by 1982 House investigators
were intensely frustrated with what they viewed as Administrator Burford's lack of cooperation in providing subpoenaed EPA documents regarding
RCRA and Superfund implementation. By this time separate House subcommittees were investigating conflict of interest allegations against
Superfund administrator Lavelle and others, Superfund political manipulation charges, and contentions that EPA personnel had knowingly destroyed
39. A striking retrenchment of federal budgetary policy, the substance of the act and commentary
first appeared in the N.Y. Times, June 27, 1981, at 1, col. 8.
40. 38 CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 452-53 (1982).
41. See supra note 2.
42. 42 U.S.C. §§6901n., 6901-07, 6911-16, 6921-31, 6941-49, 6951-54, 6961-64, 6971-79,
6981-87, 6981n. (1982).
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subpoenaed evidence and otherwise obstructed ongoing investigations.43
Finally, in the closing days of 1982, the House of Representatives
signalled to the nation that a constitutional crisis of confidence had arisen
over the EPA's management of hazardous waste programs. On December
16, the House took the unprecedented step of voting to find a cabinet
level official -EPA Administrator Ann Gorsuch Burford-in contempt
of Congress for refusing to cooperate in its implementation investigations.
Three months later she resigned her post, along with about a dozen aides
and senior subordinates, who either voluntarily left or were fired." Ms.
Burford, had earlier dismissed Superfund Administrator Rita Lavelle, who
was soon indicted on charges of perjury and obstructing a congressional
investigation. In December 1983, a federal court found Lavelle guilty of
lying to Congress concerning her foreknowledge of the extent of Aerojet
General Corporation's Superfund liability while administering the program. She was sentenced to six months' imprisonment and fined $10,000. 4'
By this time Reagan administration officials were painfully aware of
the chronic legitimacy problems engendered by the EPA's informal, closeddoor implementation decisions unaccompanied by sensitivity to the ethical
propriety of those actions. As a result, the capacity for moral leadership
figured strongly in the choice of a new EPA administrator.
Accepting the job on an interim basis in the Spring of 1983 was William
Ruckelshaus, the first person to head the EPA after President Nixon
created it in 1969. Among Mr. Ruckelshaus' first steps on resuming the
postion was the reinstatement of practices on which the legitimacy of
EPA informal action had formerly been based. He and his newly hired
subordinates announced that they intended to facilitate the "fullest possible public participation" in future agency decisionmaking; and that in
impending enforcement actions, there would be contact only between the
attorneys (for the EPA and the responsible party) working on those cases,
with no outside interference or involvement by EPA political appointees.
NEGOTIATING THE CLEANUP OF TOXIC GROUNDWATER
CONTAMINATION IN CALIFORNIA
Californians had particular cause for concern over the foundering of
Superfund implementation and EPA's legitimacy crisis in the early 1980s.
Daily revelations in the national press concerning the EPA's problems
were being paralleled by daily revelations in the California press regarding
toxic contamination of the state's groundwater. In addition to the threat
43.
44.
45.
46.

39 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 332 (1983).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 333.
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posed by the notorious Stringfellow Acid Pits to the drinking water in
southern California's Riverside County, two sites in populated areas further north were causing growing alarm among regulators and the public
alike.
First was the discovery of carcinogenic contamination of groundwater
used for drinking on and near the property of the Aerojet General Corporation in Rancho Cordova, a suburb of Sacramento. A major aerospace
research and product development firm, the company is also a significant
feature of the Sacramento-area economy. Among contaminants found in
the groundwater and soil (and some related surface water supplies) were
rocket fuels and synthetic organic solvents used in metal-cleansing.
Two years later in the San Francisco Bay Area's lower Santa Clara
Valley ("Silicone" Valley-birthplace of the state's micro-electronics
industry) high concentrations of toxic solvents used in micro-electronics
manufacture began to contaminate drinking water wells in this urban area.
In the early days of Superfund implementation, both the Sacramento and
Santa Clara Valley area leaks were quickly added to the list of high priority
cleanup sites being created under the federal act. And as the failure of
closed-door informal negotiated implementation of Superfund was becoming
more and more evident at the national level, northern California residents
naturally grew concerned regarding the use of such approaches by federal,
state, and local officials responding to problems there.
Case Studies
In examining the use of the federal Superfund legislation and California's water quality control legislation47 to regulate toxic groundwater
47. Unlike most federal environmental protection statutes, the Superfund legislation does not
delegate implementation authority directly to the states, but rather authorizes working agreements
between the EPA and appropriate state agencies responsible for implementing state statutes with
goals which overlap with the Superfund program. In California's unique system of shared bureaucratic
authority, the California Department of Health Services sets general drinking water standards with
regard to allowable concentrations of toxic and hazardous substances, often relying on federal
guidelines, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25100-25245 (West 1984). However, the state's principal
water pollution control program is embodied in the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act of
1969, as amended, CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13000-13270 (West 1984). In this Act, the legislature
divided the geographically diverse state into nine regions, and assigned implementation authority to
nine separate regional water quality control boards, each of which is empowered to adopt its own
site-specific cleanup standards when forcing polluters to remedy incidents of toxic groundwater
contamination. When supervising the cleanup of sites which are on the Superfund national priority
list (and California hosts well over 100 of them) the regional boards coordinate their enforcement
activities with the EPA, in an effort to ensure that decontamination actions they mandate under the
Porter-Cologne Act will also constitute compliance with the federal Superfund Program, CAL.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICEs, GROUNDWATER AND DRINKING WATER IN SANTA CLARA COUNTY:
A WHITrrE PAPER 23 (Oct. 5, 1984) [hereinafter WHTrrE PAPER] In the case studies developed in this

research, the Sacramento Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board had jurisdiction over the
Aerojet General case, while the San Francisco Bay regional board oversaw the cleanup effort at the
Santa Clara Valley's IBM plant.
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contamination-particularly the role of negotiation-two core questions
must be answered. The first is "How were these laws used to solve the
problems at hand?" And the second is "Why were they used this way?"
The first is addressed below, and the second is discussed in the following
section on analysis.
The Aerojet General Case
Sacramento-area residents first learned of toxic chemical leaks at the
Aerojet General plant in Rancho Cordova in mid-1979-via an information leak from a worker at the site."8 The Central Valley Regional
Water Quality Control Board initiated an investigation which discovered
five different toxic dump sites on Aerojet Generals's property and pervasive groundwater contamination underlying them.49 The most prevalent
and worrisome contaminants were synthetic organic solvents used as
degreasing agents and rocket fuels. The regional board ordered the company to cease polluting the groundwater in June 1979.50
Given the enormity of the problem and the responsible party's disinclination to freely share information, 5 the California Attorney General's
office filed suit against the Aerojet General Corporation under the state's
water quality control act, (state and federal Superfund legislation had not
yet been enacted52) on December 27, 1979. However, at the time of filing,
then-Attorney General George Deukmejian announced that the real purpose of the suit was to elicit information and stimulate cleanup activity.
He also expressed faith in the negotiation process, citing the state's desire
to "reach agreement on the problem without prolonged and expensive
litigation."'" In addition to the state action, several Rancho Cordova-area
residents also filed suit as contaminants allegedly emanating from the
Aerojet General site made their appearance in local drinking water wells.
During the following year, Aerojet continued its legal resistance to the
regional water board's and attorney general's actions, while reports of
worsening water quality in the neighborhood of the plant continued to
come forth. Amid these developments and similar cases elsewhere in the
country, Congress adopted the Comprehensive Environmental Responses,
48. Hundreds Warned Wells May Be Contaminated, Sacramento Bee, Aug. 23, 1979, at Al.
Worker Tip Lead To Cordova Water Pollution Discovery, Sacramento Bee, Oct. 25, 1979, at B 1.
49. State Seeks Aerojet Toxic Data, Sacramento Bee, Aug. 11, 1979, at B I; First Real Proof
Against Aerojet General, Sacramento Union, Sept. 18, 1979, at A3; Study Lists Five Chemical
Dumps at Aerojet, Sacramento Bee, Oct. 25, 1979, at Al.

50. Letter to Lloyd Burton from Tom Pinkos, Supervising Engineer, Sacramento Valley Regional
Water Quality Control Board (Aug. 7, 1986).
51. Aerojet Silence Criticized, Sacramento Bee, Nov. 21, 1979, at B I.
52. See supra note 47.
53. CaliforniaFiles Suit on Toxic Wastes in Sacramento County Groundwater,Los Angeles Times,
Dec. 27, 1979, at 11-3.
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Compensation, and Liability Act in 19804 (Superfund); and a year later,
when the EPA compiled its first Superfund-mandated list of the nation's
most hazardous toxic waste sites, it rated the Aerojet General-Rancho
Cordova site as the worst in California (34th nationally)."
At about the same time, the state and Aerojet redoubled their negotiation
efforts." 6 More active and thorough planning of cleanup activities was
also undertaken, although by the end of 1981 the state had still not found
the company's decontamination plan adequate.5 7
But in return for cooperating more fully in problem study, cleanup,
and negotiated settlement, the company required a significant concession.
Aerojet wanted assurances from the attorney general and the regional
board that no information it was relinquishing on the nature and extent
of contamination at its sites would be given to the public, except for
public health warnings required by state law.5" Both agencies agreed.
Unfortunately, what this meant was that during negotiation only the
most alarming information was made public, as more drinking water
contamination was discovered and more wells were capped. Furthermore,
all this was happening at the same time that the national press was full
of allegations that Rita Lavelle, a former Aerojet executive and thenadministrator of the federal Superfund program, was manipulating implementation of the law to reward political friends and punish enemies.
Meanwhile Aerojet cleanup negotiations in Sacramento proceeded confidentially, while the public was occasionally confronted with facts like
discovery that volatile organic chemicals in Rancho Cordova-area groundwater were seeping into the surface waters of the American River just
upstream of the City of Sacramento's drinking water intake. The press
also learned during this time that Aerojet may have been aware of (but
ignored) its contamination problems as far back as 1954." 9
Rumors of an impending settlement started surfacing in late 1984. But
it was not until early 1986-more than six years after the state's original
enforcement action was filed-that government officials and the Aerojet
General Corporation finally came to agreement. Since the state suit and
EPA involvement had been consolidated into one federal civil action, the
54. Comprehensive Environmental Responses, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 26
U.S.C. §§ In., 4611-12, 4662-62, 4681-82 (1982); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1364 (1982); 42 U.S.C. §§6911Ila, 6901-15, 9631-33, 9641, 9651, 9657 (1982); 49 U.S.C. § 11091 (1982).
55. Federal Hazardous Waste List Names Aerojet General in First Place, Sacramento Union,
Oct. 24, 1981, at A2.
56. Aerojet General Settlement With State Is Goal, Sacramento Bee, May 9, 1981, at B2.
57. Aerojet Cleanup Plan is Rejected, Sacramento Bee, Nov. 14, 1981, at B 1.
58. Interview with Tom Pinkos, Supervising Engineer, Central Valley Regional Water Quality
Control Board, in Sacramento, Cal. (Jan. 21, 1986).
59. Warning Memos on Aerojet General Waste Disposal Date to '54, Sacramento Bee, May 25,
1983, at AI.
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settlement took the form of a consent decree, filed in U.S. District Court
for the eastern District of California on January 15, 1986.'
In return for the state and federal governments' agreement to drop thei,
suits, Aerojet General promised to further investigate the extent of toxic
environmental contamination, define the most appropriate cleanup technologies, and take all measures necessary to remedy the public health
threat at its 8,500-acre Rancho Cordova plant and immediate environs.
In addition to the $27 million Aerojet had already expended in investigation and cleanup and future expected costs, the company's parent corporation obligated itself to provide up to $45 million more for remedial
work if Aerojet went bankrupt. 6 Aerojet also agreed to pay state agencies
and the EPA in excess of $7 million in past and future government
investigatory and enforcement costs.6 2
Santa Clara Valley
Located at the southern apex of the San Francisco Bay, the lower Santa
Clara Valley was an area devoted to orchards and farmland until postWorld War 11 urbanization transformed it into a busy commercial and
industrial center. Its largest city is San Jose, now the most populous in
the entire San Francisco Bay region. Further down the valley are Sunnyvale, Mountain View, and Palo Alto, where invention of the semi-conductor and related devices gave birth to the state and the nation's microelectronics industry.
About half of the valley's 1.4 million residents rely directly on groundwater as their primary drinking water supply, while others are served by
systems which import water from the Sierra Nevada Mountains or the
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. However, these water importers pump
much of their incoming surface supplies into the aquifer underlying the
valley, as a means of low-cost storage and to recharge the water table.
About 300 large wells, serving the major water suppliers, provide 86
percent of the groundwater used in the valley for nonagricultural purposes.63
Although a variety of commercial and industrial activities support the
valley's economy, since the late 1960s micro-electronics/data processing
technology has been the fastest growing and generally the most profitable.
As of 1984, there were several hundred firms in the valley involved in
some aspect of research, development, or production of devices com60. United States v. Aerojet General Corp., California v. Aerojet General Corp., Consent Decree,
CIVS-86-0063. Filed Jan. 15, 1986 [hereinafter Consent Decree].
61. Id. at 133-34.
62. For a synopsis of the decree, see EPA, State and Aerojet Settle on An Investigation and
Cleanup Plan, EPA REGIONAL BULLETIN No. IX (Jan. 1986).
63. WHITE PAPER supra note 47, at 3.
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prising this technology. One reason valley residents welcomed such development is that-relative to industrial plants elsewhere in the Bay Area
(like oil refineries, metalworks, and chemical manufacturers)-the microelectronics industry was fairly "clean." The only hazardous materials
employed in large quantities were synthetic organic solvents used to
achieve the high state of cleanliness necessary in component manufacture;
these were kept out of public view in large underground' storage tanks
after use, awaiting final off-site disposal.
The first evidence that the industry might not be as clean as popularly
thought came in 1981, with the discovery of high concentrations of one
of these solvents in a San Jose-area public well; the chemical involved
was 1,1,1 trichloroethane (TCA), a degreasing agent. The California
Department of Health Services and EPA advise remedial treatment of any
drinking water carrying more than 200 parts per billion (ppb) of TCA;'
while the south San Jose well was contaminated with 5,800 ppb--about
30 times the DHS action level.65
Public health investigators had suspected drinking water contamination,
because of an earlier discovery of a leaking underground solvent storage
tank at the nearby Fairchild Camera and Instrument Company. Soon
thereafter, company engineers discovered similar problems at the International Business Machines (IBM) Corporation's South San Jose production facility. Since most micro-electronic component manufacturers
in the area used solvent storage techniques similar to Fairchild's and
IBM's, county and state health officials initiated a survey of other public
water supplies proximal to all those finns. Meanwhile, the San Francisco
Bay Regional Water Quality Control Board began its own underground
tank leak detection study among south bay industrial plants, and by 1984
had discovered 93 contaminated sites in the Santa Clara Valley.' Toxic
groundwater pollution at each site was serious enough to trigger regional
board jurisdiction under the state water quality act and EPA authority
under the Superfund legislation.
Given the huge regulatory burden the regional board now faced, its
staff resolved to adopt one implementation protocol for all toxic sites on
the Superfund list, rather than making individual decisions on whether
to negotiate voluntary compliance or take adjudicatory enforcement action
in each case. The protocol adopted by the board staff was embodied in
a March 1984 memorandum to the board's executive officer.67 The pro64. EPA, National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, Volatile Synthetic Organic Chemicals,
49 Fed. Reg. 24,330 (1984).
65. WHirrE PAPER, supra note 47.
66. ld. at i 1, and Table 6.
67. Internal memo from Don Eisenbertg and Adam Olivieri, Special Projects Section to Roger
James, Executive Office, San Francisco Bay Regional Water Quality Control Board, Regional Board
Consideration of Groundwater Contamination Cases, File No. 1210.39 (Mar. 6, 1984).
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tocol first identified the various implementation options available under
the state's clean water act (waste discharge requirement, cease and desist
order, cleanup and abatement order, or referral to attorney general for
civil litigation." Then it recommended that as a matter of staff policy,
the first action in each case should be the issuance of waste discharge
requirements. The executive officer adopted the recommendation, as did
the regional board itself.
This would turn out to be one of the more significant policy decisions
made by the regional board. For to take any form of adjudicatory action
(C&D order, CAO, or attorney general referral) would be to characterize
the responsible party as a violator of environmental law. On the other
hand, to issue waste discharge requirements (WDRs) for each contaminated plant essentially meant treating each of those companies as a lawful
applicant for permission to discharge pollutants into the groundwater.
Soon after discovering the underground solvent leakage, IBM on its
own initiative sank several monitoring wells at its South San Jose facility
to measure the intensity of groundwater pollution and the shape, size,
rate of flow, and direction of migration of the contaminant plume seeping
into the aquifer. The company also dug several interception wells at
locations it considered to be at the leading edge of the plume, to extract
the polluted water, cleanse it, and then discharge it into ditches and canals
draining into San Francisco Bay.
In December 1984, the regional board issued a waste discharge requirement ruling on the IBM case which alleviated the company of additional
responsibility for defining and containing the contaminant plume, beyond
those measures IBM was already taking.' IBM and Fairchild had already
spent close to $40 million in voluntary investigation and cleanup efforts,
and the board noted that contaminant residues left in the groundwaterprimarily traces of TCA and freon-were much lower than the "action
levels" for those chemicals suggested by the California Department of
Health Services as requiring remedial treatment.
Just one month later, however, a coalition of environmental organizations, labor leaders, and local governments in Santa Clara County
appealed the regional board's WDR ruling on the IBM case to the State
Water Resource Control Board (statewide parent agency of the regional
boards). Charging that the regional board had not required IBM to do
enough and that it had resolved complex questions of scientific uncertainty
consistently in the company's favor, appellants asked the state board to
68. See CAL. WATER CODE, supra note 47,
69. San Francisco Bay Regional Water Quality Control Board, Waste Discharge Requirements
for Hazardous Materials Cleanup: IBM Corp., San Jose, Santa Clara County, Finding No. 8 (Dec.
1984).
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order the regional board to require more extensive monitoring and possibly
to mandate more thorough decontamination of drinking water in the San
Jose area.7'
Analysis of Regional Board Decisionmaking
To understand why regional board officials handled the Aerojet General
and IBM cases in the way they did, it is helpful to think of them as being
faced with the need to answer two basic policy questions. The first was
"What level of decontamination should be achieved?"; and the second
was "By what regulatory means?" Should board personnel require that
polluted groundwater be rendered entirely free of contaminants the responsible party had leaked, or only clean enough to comply with current
federal or state standards for "acceptable risk?"'" And will the agency
be most likely to achieve that goal through negotiation (establishing reasonable waste discharge requirements in consultation with the responsible
party), or through adjudicatory action (issuance of a cease and desist or
cleanup and abatement order, and/or civil litigation)?
As it turned out, neither the Sacramento Valley nor San Francisco Bay
regional boards addressed these questions sequentially. Site-specific cleanup
standards were not set before adjudicate/negotiate decisionmaking by the
boards; those standards were a principal bargaining issue, and were in
fact set during the course of implementation/enforcement negotiations in
both cases.
Figure 1 depicts the adjudicate/negotiate decisionmaking situation facing both regional boards. The numbered squares represent "decision
points" encountered by the regulator; the circles with upper-case letters
are "chance nodes" (actions taken either by the regulated interest or by
a court); and the circles within squares are "negotiation end-points", at
which negotiations terminate either in agreement or adjudicatory action.
The numbered triangles to the far right represent alternative decisional
outcomes. The flow of events through time is from left to right.
If, for example, after first learning of toxic contamination, the agency
decides to attempt negotiated compliance with the responsible party, without filing an enforcement action, eventually a compliance agreement will
or will not be reached (negotiation end-point A). If agreement is achieved,
70. Citizens for a Better Environment and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition v. San Francisco Bay
Regional Water Quality Control Board (petition for review of Action and Failure to Act in re IBM,
Before the Cal. State Water Resource Control Board)(Jan. 17, 1985).
71. For suspected carcinogens, the Cal. Dept. of Health Services' standard-setting policy is that,
based on bioassay extrapolation data, an individual experience no more than I x 10 ' lifetime risk
of developing cancer by reason of exposure to the regulated substance. CAL. DE"r. OF HEALTH
SERVICES, CARCINOGEN IDENTIFICATION POLICY, SECTION: METHODS FOR ESTIMATING CANCER RISKS
FROM ExosuR.s TO CARCINOGENS (Oct. 1982).
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FIGURE 1. TOXIC WASTE REGULATOR'S DECISION SITUATION
it may or may not be appealed by a third-party (for example, concerned
citizens' group, industry organization, union) who did not participate in
the settlement talks; the possibility of this event is depicted at chance
node B. If a third-party does appeal, after an appellate hearing (chance
node C) the agency will either have its negotiated compliance agreement
upheld (outcome 1) or rejected (outcome 2) by an adjudicatory authority.
If no third party challenges the negotiated agreement, the case is closed
(outcome 3). If, however, negotiations fail at negotiation end-point a,
the agency then moves to an adjudicatory mode.
Suppose, on the other hand, that at the initial negotiate/adjudicate
decision point (1), the agency decides its goals will best be achieved
through adjudication. Then at chance node A the responsible party may
decide to either negotiate a settlement (end-point b) or contest charges
through adjudication only (chance node E). If there is negotiation after
charges are filed and agreement is reached, a third-party may challenge

the agreement (chance node D). At hearing (chance node F), the agency's
negotiated settlement may either be upheld (outcome 4) or rejected (outcome 5). If no third party appeals the settlement, the case is closed

(outcome 6).
If the agency and responsible party fail to reach agreement after charges
are filed, after an adjudicatory hearing (chance node E) the agency may
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FIGURE 2. STATE OF CALIFORNIA & E.P.A. v. AEROJET-GENERAL
CORP. (Central Valley R.W.Q.C.B.)
win its case against the responsible party (RP), at which time the RP
either will appeal (outcome 7) or will not (outcome 8--case closed). But
if the agency loses at adjudicatory hearing, then it must decide (at decision
point 2) whether to appeal (outcome 9) or not (outcome 10). To save
space and confusion, the results of appellate action by either the RP
(beyond outcome 7) or the agency (beyond outcome 9) are not depicted.
Central Valley
Figure 2 uses the decision tree to illustrate the Central Valley regional
board's decisionmaking in the Aerojet General case. Decision point 1
occurred in the autumn of 1979. Central Valley board officials said two
considerations featured prominently in their decision to refer the case to
the attorney general rather than seek negotiated compliance. 72 First, the
threat both to the public health (Sacramento-area drinking water) and to
other beneficial uses of water was both immediate and serious. And
secondly, the board staff felt that the apparent responsible party (Aerojet
General) was not cooperating adequately in the provision of information
72. Interviews with William Crook, Executive Officer, Paul Jepperson, Supervising Engineer,
and Tom Pinkos, Supervising Engineer, Central Valley Regional Water Quality Board, in Sacramento,
Cal. (Jan. 21, 1986) [hereinafter Crook, Jepperson & Pinkos].
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or in emergency containment to consititute compliance with the State's
water quality act.
But after referral to the attorney general's office, the state bureaucracy's
decisionmaking became more complex. The regional board essentially
became the attorney general's client in this case, with the result that the
regional board's decontamination strategy and the attorney general's litigation strategy inevitably began to influence each other.
The regional board desperately needed information on the identity of
the contaminants, their concentration, and their direction and rate of flow
through the groundwater in order to devise an effective cleanup program;
the attorney general wanted the same information in order to prove that
Aerojet had violated the law. Moreover, several private citizens and small
businesses in the Rancho Cordova area who felt they had been harmed
by groundwater contamination filed multi-million dollar damages actions
against Aerojet, and they wanted access to the same information the state
did.
It was within this context that the regional board and the attorney
general finally agreed that, in return for the information they wanted from
the company, they would share none of it with the public, press, or other
litigants except as required by law to avert public health endangerment
(for example, the issuance of drinking water advisories)." Since the
attorney general had announced on the day he filed the suit his intention
to settle out of court as soon as a certain threshold level of investigation
and cleanup had been achieved, the bargaining agenda between Aerojet
and the state was already set: How much information had to be generated,
how would that information be used, and how clean must the contaminated
water be rendered?
The State of Californiaand U.S. EPA v. Aerojet General Corp. consent
decree shows that, pending culmination of studies on the extent of contamination and final cleanup technology feasibility, government negotiators would require Aerojet to render contaminated water no cleaner than
the 200 ppb suggested standard adopted by EPA and DHS. When asked
why this interim figure was chosen, regional board staff cited current
scientific uncertainty over the adverse health effects of TCA and the
technical/economic difficulties involved in getting the water cleaner.7'
Since Aerojet was playing litigation "hardball", state enforcement personnel were also unsure of whether a court would uphold their authority
to adopt a figure substantially below 200 ppb, since adverse health effects
below this level have not been proven.76
73. The information "blackout" did not apply to data the regional board staff gathered on its own
initiative, either at or near the plant site. Letter from Tom Pinkos, supra note 50.
74, Consent Decree, supra note 60,
75. Crook, Jepperson & Pinkos, supra note 72.
76. Id.
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FIGURE 3. In Re I.B.M., SANTA CLARA COUNTY
(San Francisco Bay R.W.Q.C.B.)
At the time of this writing, it is unclear whether any third-party will
appeal the terms of the consent decree (Figure 2, chance node D). Since
this suit is separate from the dozens of damages actions private citizens
have filed against Aerojet, those private suits are still pending.
Santa Clara Valley
In contrast to the Aerojet General case, Figure 3 shows a different
approach and different outcomes in the S.F. Bay regional board's IBM
case. When asked why, at decision point 1, staff resolved to negotiate
waste discharge requirements rather than file an adjudicatory action, they
had several responses.' 7 First, they all stressed IBM's immediate and
complete cooperation in identifying the source and extent of groundwater
contamination, and in devising effective means for controlling it. Second,
the public health threat was not as grave as some other situations in their
experience; that is, the kinds and concentrations of chemicals generally
did not pose as immediate or substantial a known danger as some other
sites under the board's jurisdiction. Third, in addition to IBM's willingness to do all necessary cleanup, it also had the financial ability to do
77. Interviews with Stephen Morse, Senior Engineer, Lawrence Kolb, Supervising Engineer, and
Roger James, Executive Officer, San Francisco Bay Regional Water Quality Control Board, in
Oakland, Cal. (Feb. 25, 28, 1986 and Mar. 7, 1986) [hereinafter Morse, Kolb & James].
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so; aside from the regional board staff time involved in review of IBM's
remedial investigation and cleanup measures, the cleanup process was
being conducted (in the board's view) expeditiously and at little cost to
the state.
In further exploring the S.F. Bay regional board's stated policy preference for regulating all Superfund sites through the waste discharge
requirement process (in which the responsible party's engineers essentially negotiate a site-specific cleanup standard with the staff), board
personnel offered several reasons. Overall, they view their ultimate goal
as getting as much contaminant as possible out of the groundwater as
quickly as possible. In their experience, setting a waste discharge requirement was mostly a matter of regional board engineers interacting with
the responsible party's engineers, whereas any form of adjudicatory
enforcement action was mostly "our lawyers fighting with their lawyers."
They pointed out that just as much engineering staff time goes into an
adjudicatory enforcement (research, depositions, interrogatories, testimony) as in setting and reviewing waste discharge requirements, but with
no tangible results (that is, no decontamination occurring during much
of the adversary process). In sum, bargaining over a WDR was more
efficient and effective, in their view.
Lastly, the S.F. Bay regional board staff also acknowledged institutional
incapacity insofar as enforcement is concerned. Confronted with the
responsibility for overseeing the nearly one hundred nationally rated
Superfund cleanup sites within their jurisdiction, board officials estimated
that their enforcement staff was not large enough to effectively adjudicate
more than about 15 percent of those cases anyway. In other words, unless
the state was willing to massively augment regional board enforcement
and review staff (which at that point it was not), the success of the board's
cleanup program was critically dependent on the good will and voluntary
compliance of the responsible parties.
In defense of its position, S.F. Bay regional board officials referred to
the language of both federal and state statutes which authorize taking cost
into consideration in site-specific standard-setting, and then they pointed
out that TCA levels were already far below what the state health department and the EPA currently consider to be health-threatening. Reference
was also made to a device known as a "cost-degradation curve," which
the S.F. Bay regional board has used as a conceptual aid in deciding the
level at which to set site-specific standards.
Figure 4 is a reproduction of such a curve from regional board policy
guidelines.78 It generally depicts a situation in which as higher levels of
78.
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decontamination are achieved, so does the per-volume-unit cost of achieving them. Once the threshold level of decontamination of a given chemical
has been reached (200 ppb in the case of TCA), board officials then
consider the question of how much cleaner they should order the water
to be as entirely within their own discretion. For example, if in the IBM
case Alternative 3 in Figure 4 represented the 200 ppb contamination
level, the S.F. Bay board staff might set a site-specific cleanup standard
at any point along the curve to the left of Alternative 3. Appellants in
the IBM case want that standard set at or near the Alternative 1 position;
the regional board in this case opted for something between one and three,
as they did not consider the costs which would have been imposed on
IBM by Alternative I to be justifiable.
Since this concept was first set forth in 1983 (EPA alluded to a similiar
construct in its 1984 drinking water regulations79), it has drawn attention
from supporters and detractors alike. Skeptics point out that in many
cases the data on per-unit treatment costs are generated by the toxic
79. See supra note 64.
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FIGURE 5. SAMPLE TIME/COST/DEGRADATION CURVE, FROM SAN
FRANCISCO BAY R.W.Q.C.B. STAFF INTERVIEWS (1986)
polluters themselves; since they will be paying the bills, they have every
incentive to make stringent decontamination standards look more costly
to achieve than they might actually be. Also, after two years of working
with the concept, one S.F. Bay board official has commented that in many
of the Santa Clara County cases they are dealing with now, the curve
actually looks more like that depicted in Figure 5. In his view, the hardest
bargaining usually occurs at the outset of the case, as responsible parties
are being urged to dig enough monitoring and interception wells to adequately define and contain the contaminant plume. The other principal
issue-what the final site-specific cleanliness standard should be---essentially boils down to a question of when the responsible party should be
allowed to turn off the pumps on the interception and extraction wells
(the wells pulling contaminated water out of the ground for treatment).
The longer the wells operate in this 3-dimensional model, the cleaner the
groundwater becomes and the higher the costs are for the responsible
party. Conversely, the sooner the wells are shut down, the more money
the responsible party saves, and the greater the contaminant concentration
remains in the groundwater.
Comment
In both the IBM and Aerojet General cases, bargaining between the
responsible parties and government officials played a highly significant
role in cleanup goal-setting along each of the decision paths in Figures
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2 and 3. Third parties not privy to the negotiation process have subsequently attacked the IBM decision as an abuse of S.F. Bay regional board
discretion, while it is as yet unclear whether Sacramento-area residents
intend to challenge the just-filed settlement of the six-year-long Aerojet
General case. Public mistrust of and disagreement with the S.F. Bay
board's action in the IBM case is obviously substantial, or environmental
groups, unions, and local governments served by the Santa Clara aquifer
would not be appealing the board order. Early press reaction to the Aerojet
General settlement has also not been favorable; it remains to be seen
whether an appeal from this negotiated judgment will be mounted, although
board personnel see this as a real possibility if the decree is not modified."0
There is, in sum, substantial public suspicion regarding the use of negotiation to remedy incidents of groundwater contamination in these cases."

It is to that task, and the related one of formulating policy recommendations based on these criteria, that we now turn our attention.
EVALUATIVE CRITERIA AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

A central concern of this research (and one facing any public official
using bargaining in discretionary decisionmaking) is how to imbue agency
actions reached through informal negotiation with some of the same
attributes of legitimacy which can usually be acquired only at the cost
of lengthy and formalized administrative due process. As discussed earlier
in this paper (based on the work of Freedman), those attributes are constitutionality, effectiveness, responsiveness, and fairness.
The constitutionality of negotiated administrative dispute settlement is
80. Telephone interview with Tom Pinkos, Supervising Engineer, Central Valley Regional Water
Quality Control Board, in Sacramento, Cal. (July I, 1986).
8 t. At press time, the author learned that the original consent decree has indeed been rejected,
owing largely to two significant events which occurred while the proposed decree was still under
consideration in 1986. First, Congress amended the Superfund legislation through adoption of Pub.
L. No. 99-499, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986. The amendments pegged Superfund cleanup standards to those established under other federal environmental
statutes, thus somewhat narrowing agency discretion in setting site-specific cleanup requirements.
It also empowered state governments to set tougher cleanup standards than those promulgated by
the EPA, yet have them enforced under Superfund authority.
Second, California voters--alarmed at the seeming slowness and ambiguity in state agency toxic
substances standard-setting and cleanup procedures-approved Proposition 65. This ballot initiative
ordered the governor to expeditiously adopt human health protection standards for a wide variety
of toxics, many of which have not yet been subject to standard-setting by the EPA. As the initiative
is worded, these state standards may well be considerably more stringent than those adopted or to
be adopted by the EPA.
Concerned that increased state authority under SARA combined with anticipated rigid new state
standards under Proposition 65 would uncontrollably expand its cleanup liability, the Aerojet General
Corporation withdrew its consent to the decree as originally proposed. As of winter, 1988 negotiations
over a new decree were still under way. Telephone interview with James Hanson, Environmental
Engineer, Toxics and Waste Division, EPA Rgn. 9, San Francisco, Cal. Jan. 26, 1988.
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a rich and complex enough subject to warrant separate treatment in another
article. Our concern here will be limited to criteria for evaluating when
negotiation is or is not being used effectively, responsively, and fairly.
Effectiveness Criteria
A starting point in determining whether an agency is or is not using
negotiation effectively is to determine if the agency was well-advised to
undertake negotiation in the first place (Figure 1, decision point 1). When
asked how they generally decide between adjudication and negotiation
once they learn of groundwater contamination, administrators interviewed
during the course of this research said they take into account factors like:
(1) past history (if any) of board dealings with the responsible party (RP),
(2) magnitude of the contamination problem, (3) promptness of reporting
contamination and responsiveness to cleanup suggestions, and (4) RP
intent. If it is the first time the RP has caused contamination or if it has
fully and voluntarily complied with board directives in the past, if the
contamination does not require an immediate and substantial public
expenditure for cleanup, if the RP promptly and fully reports the contamination and immediately makes a good faith effort to clean it up, and
if there is no evidence of intent to contaminate or to conceal evidence of
contamination, the administrators' tendency seems to be to negotiate
compliance rather than opt for adversarial enforcement. Conversely, if
there is a history of enforcement problems with the RP, if catastrophic
environmental damage is caused, if the RP delays in reporting contamination or declines to make good-faith investigation and cleanup efforts,
or if the RP willfully or negligently contaminated the environment and
attempted to conceal the problem, then (in the view of respondents in
this research) adjudication is usually indicated. 2
Ideally, the agency administrator at decision point 1 in Figure 1 (the
initial adjudicate/negotiate decision juncture) will think through the possible outcomes involved in following either path, and then (based on
answers to questions such as those raised in the preceding paragraph)
will be able to assign rough probabilities (at each range node) for the
achievement of desired outcomes via the available paths. So one criterion
for evaluating an initial adjudicate/negotiate decision is whether there is
a rational basis for an agency decisionmaker's judgment that there is a
higher probability of achieving a desired level of cleanup through negotiation than through adjudication. Just as lawyers routinely make probabilistic estimations of their chances of winning a case if it goes to trial, 3
82. Crook, Jepperson & Pinkos, supra note 73; Morse, Kolb & James, supra note 78.
83. See, e.g., R. BEHN & J. VAUPEL, QUICK ANALYSIS FOR BusY DECISIONMAKERS, 133-62 (1982).
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so must agency decisionmakers be capable of and ready to make rationally
defensible estimations of their chances of achieving desired cleanup objectives either through negotiation or adjudication.
Beyond agency action taken at decision point 1 in Figure 1 (the initial
adjudicate/negotiate decision), it is obvious from the paths traced in Figures 2 and 3 that negotiation played a significant role in both cases beyond
this first juncture. Bargaining in the Aerojet General case commenced
after an initial decision to adjudicate by the state, it was much more
prolonged than in the IBM case, and (at this writing) it has not yet settled
the case. Another important efficacy criterion, then, is the length of the
time taken to achieve settlement between the agency and the responsible
party, if negotiation is attempted. But in addition to a simple measurement
of time from the discovery of toxic contamination to the successful conclusion of cleanup negotiations lies the question of why delay in settlement, if any, occurred. Can it be attributed to causes such as RP recalcitrance,
an excessive agency caseload (insufficient personnel), or jurisdictional
confusion, and lack of interagency coordination?' So a second general
efficacy criterion involves the three closely related questions of how long
cleanup negotiations lasted, why any appreciable delays may have occurred,
and what was done about them.
A third significant, quantifiable measurement of the relative effectiveness of agency bargaining is the site-specific cleanup standard for various
pollutants achieved through negotiation. As we have seen, for example,
initially there was an approximate forty-fold difference in allowable TCA
concentrations at the two sites studied in this research (about 5 ppb at
the IBM site and 200 ppb at Aerojet). However, federal and state officials
have been careful to point out that the Aerojet figure represents an interim
guideline, subject to downward revision after its investigation is completed.85
Fairness and Responsiveness
In determining whether an agency has negotiated a decontamination
agreement in a manner which is genuinely responsive to public concerns
regarding the protection of their health and safety, the question of public
access to information looms large. Site-specific responsiveness criteria
include the answers to questions like "How much was the public told
about a toxic contamination incident?" "When?" And "By whom?" The
84. Regarding coordination difficulties, see Months After EPA Settlement, Ohio Cleanup Has Yet
to Begin, Washington Post, Feb. 26, 1983, at Al l. According to respondents, the state and regional
water boards, Department of Health Services, and Regional IX EPA officials have been experiencing
interagency coordination problems of their own, See Crooks, Jepperson & Pinkos, supra note 72;
and Morse, Kolb & James, supra note 77; WHrrE PAPER, supra note 47.
85. See supra note 50.
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same questions hold true for public information regarding compliance
negotiations with responsible parties.
However, agencies in the cases studied found themselves operating in
largely a reactive mode, insofar as the flow of public information was
concerned. As currently structured and staffed under state budget authority, none of California's regional water quality control boards has a permanent, full-time public information or community relations officer
responsible for fully informing the general public on incidents of toxic
waste exposure.
This reactive bureaucratic stance was quite in keeping with policy at
the EPA during the tenure of Administrator Burford, when she was making
fatal budget cuts in its public participation and information programs."
But when William Ruckleshaus briefly reassumed directorship of the
agency, one of his first moves was to establish a program to reinstate the
"fullest possible public participation" in agency decisionmaking on such
issues as Superfund site cleanup. 7
In part because of this renewed budgetary emphasis, the Region IX
EPA offices formulated a detailed community involvement plan for Santa
Clara Valley Superfund sites.8" Included in this program was a milliondollar grant to the S.F Bay Regional Water Quality Control Board; some
of these funds were earmarked for the hiring of temporary public information officer.
In the Sacramento area, the EPA and the state also developed an extensive program for soliciting public comment on the proposed court settlement of the Superfund enforcement suit that the state originally filed
against Aerojet General. In this case, an additional impetus to inform and
consult the public came in part from political leaders bothered by the
lack of public participation earlier in the negotiation process. In response
to concerns expressed by Sacramento assemblyman Lloyd Connelly to
the California attorney general, the state and the EPA wrote a 120-day
public comment period into the agreement, to be completed before making
final the proposed settlement decree. During this time EPA and state
officials held informational workshops for the public in affected communities. When appropriate, some of these comments may be adopted
as substantive modifications to the final settlement, if the state and Aerojet
agree and the judge so rules.8 9
One purpose of the EPA community involvement plan was to help the
86. See supra note 35.
87. Infra note 88.
88. EPA, Community Involvement Plan, South Bay Area, Region IX, Hazardous Site Control
Div., Santa Clara County, Cal.) (Apr. 15, 1985). See also Peterson, Ruckleshaus Tightens EPA
Ethics, Washington Post, May 20, 1983, at A13, col. 1.
89. See supra notes 52 & 59.
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regional boards shift from reactive to pro-active modes of action, regarding public access to information on site-specific regulation of toxic environmental contamination.' But as important a criterion as the provision
of timely, accurate, unsolicited public information is, agency obligations
to enhance the responsiveness and fairness of its negotiating behavior in
toxic contamination cases may need to go beyond a pro-active public
communications effort. When significant questions of public health and
safety are at issue, perhaps true responsiveness and fairness connote some
form of meaningful public participation in the making of bargained settlements, rather than the public simply being informed of the existence
of settlement negotiations before, during, or after the fact.
Thus a final criterion for evaluating the legitimacy of agency negotiating
behavior concerns the degree to which agency personnel identified interested and concerned parties in the communities affected by decontamination decisionmaking, and then attempted to integrate their participation
into the decisionmaking process.
Exactly how concerned citizens should be involved in agency deliberations is a question which has been stirring considerable controversy
and some interesting experimentation lately. In matters concerning not
the cleaning up of spilled waste but the siting of new hazardous waste
treatment facilities, both Massachusetts and California have adopted novel
approaches. A recently enacted Massachusetts statute mandates bargaining
between state and local government officials and would-be developers of
hazardous waste facilities over questions of plant siting and operations.
If negotiations fail, the state has preemptive authority to arbitrate a final
siting decision. 9'
Local pre-emption legislation has so far been viewed as politically
toxic by the California legislature, and such an approach has not been
adopted there--despite the best lobbying efforts of the state's chemical
manufacturing and treatment industries.92 But the state is experimenting
seriously with noncoercive multi-lateral mediation among local and state
government officials, would-be facility developers, and concerned citizen
groups over new facility siting in southern California.
The supporters93 and critics of "environmental mediation" nationally
seem equally ardent in their views; there is also a growing literature
90. EPA, INVOLVEMENT PLAN, supra note 88.
91. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN., chs. 210, 40A (West 1979). For an explanation and discussion of
the law, see Bacow & Milkey, Responding to Local Opposition to Hazardous Waste Facilities: The
MassachusettsApproach, RESOLVE (Winter/Spring 1983).
92. Morell, The Siting of Hazardous Waste Facilities in California, 25 PUBLIC AFFAIRS REP. No.
5 (UC Berkeley, Inst. of Gov't Studies (1984)).
93. A. TALBOT, SErruNo THINGS (1983).
94. Schoenbrod, Limits and Dangers of Environmental Mediation:A Review Essay, 58 N.Y. U.
L. REV. 1453 (1983).
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recommending additional cautious experimentation and research with this
technique.9" But Central Valley Regional Board administrators said Aerojet General was totally resistant to public involvement in negotiations,
for fear that confidentiality would be breached and sensitive information
would find its way to the plaintiffs' future private suits against the company. Agency officials also doubted whether most "concerned citizens"
had either the technical expertise or the time to devote to a very extensive
and involved negotiation process. Further, the board felt that it was constitutionally charged with responsibility for protecting the public interest;
and that direct citizen involvement.might well hinder rather than help the
negotiation process, especially when there is pending litigation.'
But if simple press release-style public information programs are put
at one end of a public involvement spectrum and direct public participation
in negotiations at the other, there is still plenty of room for innovative
agency action in between. For instance, unless a public agency has made
some binding assurance of confidentiality in bilateral compliance negotiations with the RP, agency officials can act as "information intermediaries." In addition to disseminating updates on settlement negotiations
to the press, agency officials can (1) identify third parties (individuals,
community organizations, local government officials) who feel they have
the most "at stake" in settlement negotiations; (2) consult with these
parties either individually or as a group as negotiations with the RP
progress; and (3) carry any concerns or suggestions from third parties
back to the negotiation process, as a way of structuring those responses
into bargaining deliberations without citizens having to be present.
Different observers recommend identifying these "stakeholders" by
different means, as well as acknowledging the difficulty of doing so at
all.97 One threshold criterion for consultation is certainly the ability and
intent of a disaffected third party to effectively appeal a negotiated settlement if that party did not feel adequately consulted during negotiations.
Summary of Evaluative Criteria
There are about a half-dozen criteria which overseers and observers
can use to evaluate the relative legitimacy of administrative bargaining
with polluters over toxic waste decontamination. Stated as questions:
1. Based on the responsible party's behavior, was the agency rationally
justified in deciding if and when to negotiate compliance rather than
adjudicate?
2. How much time elapsed between discovery of toxic contamination
95. Amy, The Politics of Environmental Mediation, II ECOLOGY L. Q. 1 (1983).
96. Pinkos, supra note 68; Pinkos, supra note 50
97. See supra notes 92-95.
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and the conclusion of compliance negotiations? If significant delays in
compliance occurred, why did they happen and how were they resolved?
3. What site-specific cleanup standards for individual toxic contaminants were adopted and implemented?
4. How thoroughly, when, and by what means did the agency inform
the public both of the existence of a toxic contamination threat and of
agency intent to remedy the threat through consensual means?
5. Did the agency keep the public apprised of the progress (or lack
thereof) of compliance negotiations?
6. Did the agency attempt (a) to identify significant "stakeholders"
(for example, groups of concerned citizens, local government officials,
community organizations) with an interest in the outcome of settlement
negotiations; (b) to solicit their views and responses regarding compliance
talks with polluters; and (c) to integrate those views and responses into
the settlement agreement?
Taken together, these questions can provide a useful yardstick for
measuring whether an agency has enhanced or detracted from the legitimacy of its use of power in conducting compliance talks with toxic
polluters. For them to be used effectively over time, though, requires
that a data base of settled cases be established as a starting point in the
comparative evaluation of future case handling-a suggestion discussed
in conclusion below.
Concluding Policy Recommendations
First, create a data base of cases settled through compliance negotiation. Somewhere in the case files of the agencies responsible for controlling toxic groundwater contamination is site-specific information for
each incident on (1) when contamination was discovered, (2) the nature
and extent of contamination, (3) who the responsible party was, (4) what
remedial measures were taken, (5) what site-specific, pollutant-specific
cleanup standards were adopted, and (6) the time elapsed from contaminant discovery to achievement of those standards (final cleanup). Unfortunately, although part of the public record, such information is often
difficult to come by and is not organized into a standardized, accessible
format.
Comparative evaluation of future agency bargaining effectiveness would
be made much easier if there existed a standardized reporting format for
all settled cases, with data supplied for the six categories listed above.
Although the circumstances of each contamination site are to some extent
unique, there are likewise many similarities among them. Comparative
examination of factors like extent of contamination, standards adopted,
and time needed to achieve them could provide a useful reflection on
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"how good a deal" an agency was able to make in compliance talks and
how efficiently the bargain was monitored, once made. In addition to
providing a criterion for external review, such a data base would also
provide an invaluable "institutional memory," for an agency to use in
monitoring its own performance and the past behavior of responsible
parties. If the data show consistently rapid effective compliance by some
RP's and consistent delay and resistance by others, agency negotiators
can use this information in rationally justifying adjudicate/negotiate decisions in the future.
Second, use a "media report card" to update the public on agency
compliance activities. Regional board personnel interviewed for this research
reported that one problem with the negotiation process was its use as a
delaying tactic by some responsible parties. 9" Polluters would miss deadlines for the submission of needed information and hold off on contracting
for cleanup work until the failure of a negotiation seemed imminent and
adjudication inevitable. Only then would they reluctantly, half-heartedly
respond to agency directives, in the hope of achieving weaker standards
and more time.
One way for an agency to remedy this behavior without having to
constantly resort to the threat of litigation is by regularly informing the
public of the comparative bargaining behavior of the responsible parties
with which it is working. Perhaps every 30 to 60 days agency personnel
could report to local news media on which responsible parties were making good-faith efforts to follow agency cleanup directives and which ones
were resisting them. In addition to keeping the public informed of the
status of ongoing cleanup efforts, such a technique might persuade otherwise recalcitrant polluters that the public relations liability engendered
by "poor grades" in periodic agency reports to the media might not be
worth whatever benefits would be achieved through purposeful delays in
compliance.
Third, develop an ongoing, permanent, pro-active public involvement
capability as an integral component of all compliance activities. EPA
funding of the S.F. Bay Regional Board's community involvement program has certainly exerted some legitimizing influence on agency action
in the Santa Clara Valley. However, the program is also post-hoc (established after third parties appealed the IBM decision) and temporary (federal funds are running out; state funds are not budgeted). Eventually
policy makers must come to grips with the fact that public involvement
in informal agency action directly affecting public health and safety is
not a public relations luxury, to be trimmed away or deleted completely
when budgets get tight. As the EPA learned in 1983, some form of
98. Morse, Kolb, & James, supra note 77.
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effective community participation has become a virtual necessity in establishing the legitimacy of informal agency action. Eschewing the due
process model of policy implementation cannot be equated with relieving
the agencies of all responsibility for public notice and participation. To
do so would be to: undercut the very values the due process model has
sought to reinforce; and it would drastically erode any remaining public
confidence in how public agencies use their power. Traditionally, whenever an agency loses that confidence it then finds itself subject to a major
legislative overhaul.
Just what kind of public involvement is appropriate to a given agency
handling a given case remains an open question. Described earlier was
a public involvement continuum, with a pro-active public information
program at one end, direct "stakeholder" participation in informal compliance talks at the other, and the agency as an "information intermediary"
somewhere in between. At the very least, it is incumbent on the agency
and its overseers to recognize that some form of involvement is necessary,
and then tailor the specific form to individual cases.
CONCLUSION
Ideally, we are in the process not of retreating from the due process
model but evolving beyond it-advancing to legitimized informal action
when possible and falling back on formal due process when necessary.
Some of the authors cited here have discussed this ideal as the evolution
from "autonomous" to "responsive" law."
On a more mundane and strategic level, we are also talking about
cheaper, simpler, faster ways to achieve policy implementation goals than
traditional due process affords us. It is clear by now that how well we
succeed will depend in large part on how well agency administrators
understand the ethical implications of their bargaining behavior. If we
equate ethical administrative behavior with that which enhances the legitimacy of an agency's use of power, we may finally come to see that
genuinely fair, responsive informal process and cost-effective implementation are not separable or discordant objectives. Ethics and efficiency
are and will remain inextricably intertwined.

99. P. NONET & P. SELZNICK, supra note 21.

